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Abstract
We analyze continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with two-armed
bandits when there is no discounting. We show that for all specifications of prior
beliefs and payoff-generating processes that satisfy some separability condition, the
unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium can be computed in a simple closed
form involving only the expected current payoff of the risky arm and the expected
full-information payoff, given current information. The separability condition holds
in a variety of models that have been explored in the literature, all of which assume
that the risky arm’s expected payoff per unit of time is time-invariant and actual
payoffs are generated by a process with independent and stationary increments. The
separability condition does not hold when the expected payoff per unit of time is
subject to state-switching.
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Introduction
We analyze the undiscounted version of a class of continuous-time two-armed bandit
models in which a number of players act non-cooperatively, trying to learn an unknown
parameter that governs the risky arm’s expected payoff per unit of time. Actual payoffs are
given by stochastic processes with stationary and independent increments. Assuming that
all actions and payoffs are public information, we restrict players to Markov strategies with
the common posterior belief about the unknown parameter as the natural state variable.
In this setting, the expected infinitesimal change in a players’ payoff function is pro-
portional to the overall intensity of experimentation performed at the given point in time.
As in Bolton and Harris (2000), this separability condition implies that best responses
can be computed without knowledge of a player’s value function. In fact, given the cur-
rent belief, a player’s optimal action depends only on the intensity of experimentation
performed by the other players, the expected current payoff of the risky arm, and the
expected full-information payoff – it does not depend on the precise specification of the
payoff-generating process.
This insight allows us to handle a much larger class of priors and payoff-generating
processes than the existing literature on bandit-based multi-agent learning in continuous
time. More specifically, we present five examples that fit in our general framework. In the
first, payoffs are generated by a Brownian motion with unknown drift, and the agents’
prior belief about this drift is an arbitrary discrete distribution; this extends the setup of
Bolton and Harris (1999, 2000) where the prior is a Bernoulli distribution. In the second,
payoffs come from a Poisson process with unknown intensity, and the agents’ prior belief
about this intensity is again an arbitrary discrete distribution; this generalizes the setup of
Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010) who also assume a Bernoulli
prior. These two examples are special cases of a third in which payoffs are generated
by a Lévy process, that is, a continuous-time process with independent and stationary
increments; a single-agent version of this setup was explored by Cohen and Solan (2013)
under a Bernoulli prior and a specific assumption on the distribution of jumps. In the
fourth example, payoffs stem again from a Brownian motion with unknown drift, but the
prior belief is a normal distribution; this is the same specification as in Jovanovic (1979).
In the fifth, payoffs are generated by a Poisson process with unknown intensity, but now
the agents’ prior belief about this intensity is characterized by a Gamma distribution; this
specification has been assumed by Moscarini and Squintani (2010).
This broadening of the class of payoff-generating processes, and the generalization
from Bernoulli to arbitrary discrete priors in particular, is not entirely without costs,
however. In fact, while the specifics of the payoff-generating process do not affect mutual
best responses at a given belief, they are highly relevant when it comes to ‘synthesizing’
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belief-contingent action profiles into a profile of Markov strategies that induces a well-
defined law of motion for posterior beliefs. In the models of Bolton and Harris (1999,
2000), Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010), beliefs evolve on the
unit interval, and this allows for a space of admissible Markov strategies large enough
to accommodate the discontinuities of actions with respect to beliefs which are an im-
mutable feature of asymmetric equilibria. Such a strategy space can also be defined in
the Poisson-Gamma case where only one component of the posterior distribution (the
shape parameter) evolves stochastically, and in a special case of Lévy payoffs where the
size of observed jumps is the only source of information, so posterior beliefs are piecewise
constant. In general, however, we must invoke results on the existence and uniqueness
of solutions to stochastic differential equations that rely on Lipschitz continuity of coef-
ficients. This rules out asymmetric equilibria but, as our main result shows, the space
of Lipschitz continuous strategies is large enough to ensure existence of a unique sym-
metric Markov perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium strategy has a simple explicit form,
moreover.
Besides Bolton and Harris (2000), the undiscounted limit of a continuous-time stochas-
tic game with one-dimensional state space has also been studied in Harris (1988, 1993)
and Bergemann and Välimäki (1997, 2002), yielding a much simpler characterization
of equilibria than under discounting. More recent applications of this methodology to
single-agent experimentation problems can be found in Bonatti (2011) and Peitz, Rady
and Trepper (2015). It should be noted, however, that the advantages of considering
the undiscounted game hinge on the stationarity of the environment in which the players
are learning (meaning in particular that the average payoff per unit of time does not
change over time). When payoffs are generated by a Brownian motion with an unknown
drift that is subject to Markovian state-switching between a high and a low level as in
Keller and Rady (1999, 2003), for example, the separability condition is violated, and the
computation of best responses requires knowledge of the value function.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sets up the game, introduces the
separability condition and states our assumptions on priors, payoff-generating processes
and strategy spaces. Section 2 proves existence of a unique symmetric Markov perfect
equilibrium under these assumptions. Section 3 presents our five examples. Section 4
briefly considers a setting where separability fails because of state switching. Section 5
offers some concluding remarks.
1 The Experimentation Game
Time t ∈ [0,∞) is continuous. There are N ≥ 1 players, each of them endowed with
one unit of a perfectly divisible resource per unit of time. Each player faces a two-armed
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bandit problem where she continually has to decide what fraction of the available resource
to allocate to each arm.
Assumption 1 (Payoffs) There are independent stochastic processes S1, . . . , SN , R0,
R1, . . . , RN , a real number s and a real-valued random variable µ such that: (i) the pro-
cesses Sn − st, n = 1, . . . , N , are identically distributed martingales independent of µ;
(ii) conditional on the realization of µ, the processes Rn − µt, n = 0, 1, . . . , N , are iden-
tically distributed martingales.
We interpret Sn as the payoff-generating process on player n’s safe arm, and assume
that its expected flow payoff s is commonly known. For n = 1, . . . , N , we interpret Rn as
the payoff-generating process on player n’s risky arm, and assume that its expected flow
payoff µ is unknown to the players. The process R0, finally, provides a background signal,
ensuring that the players eventually learn the value of µ even if they all play safe all the
time.
Let kn,t ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of the available resource that player n allocates to
the risky arm at time t; this fraction is required to be measurable with respect to the
information that the player possesses at time t. The player’s cumulative payoff up to time
T is then given by the time-changed process SnT−τn(T ) + R
n




measures the operational time that the risky arm has been used. In view of property (iii),
the player’s expected payoff (conditional on µ) is E
[∫ T
0 {(1− kn,t)s+ kn,tµ} dt
]
.
The players start with a common prior belief about µ, and thereafter all observe each
other’s actions and outcomes as well as the time-changed process R0τ0(t) where τ
0(t) = k0t
with k0 > 0 exogenously given and arbitrarily small. So they hold common posterior
beliefs throughout time.
Assumption 2 (Beliefs) At time t the players believe that µ has a cumulative distribu-
tion function H(·;πt), where πt is a sufficient statistic for the observations on R0, . . . , RN
up to time t, and H represents a conjugate family of distributions. The safe expected flow
payoff s lies in the interior of the support of H(·;π0).
With s lying in the interior of the support of the prior distribution of µ, each player
has an incentive to learn the quality of the risky arm.
The evolution of the sufficient statistic over time is driven by N + 1 distinct sources
of information, namely the observations on R0, R1, . . . RN . The following assumption
specifies how beliefs evolve when only one of these sources is observed, and at full intensity.
Assumption 3 (Generator) Fix a player n and consider the time-invariant action pro-
file for which kn = 1 whereas kj = 0 for all j ∈ {0, . . . , N} \ {n}. Then the corresponding
process π is a time-homogeneous Markov process with infinitesimal generator Gn.
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By property (ii) in Assumption 1, we have G1 = G2 = . . . = GN , for which we simply
write G.
If we change player n’s time-invariant intensity to kn ∈ [0, 1] while keeping all other
intensities at zero, the resulting deceleration of the process of observations implies the
scaled-down generator knG for the sufficient statistic; see Dynkin (1965), for example.
The same applies to the background signal, of course, with associated generator k0G.
Finally, a repeated application of Trotter (1959) invoking the conditional independence
of the processes R0, . . . , RN establishes that the generator associated with time-invariant
intensities (k0, k1, . . . , kN) ∈ [0, 1]N+1 is (k0 + K)G where K =
∑N
n=1 kn measures how
much of the N available units of the resource is allocated to risky arms – we call it the
intensity of experimentation.
The fact that the infinitesimal generator of the sufficient statistic π is linear in k0+K
will play a crucial role in our analysis. In more heuristic fashion, we can rewrite this
separability condition as
E [u(πt+dt) | πt, k1,t, . . . , kN,t ] = u(πt) + (k0 +Kt)Gu(πt) dt, (1)
where u : [0, 1] → IR is any function in the domain of G, and Kt =
∑N
n=1 kn,t.
Given the current belief H(·;π), let m(π) denote the expected current (or myopic)
payoff from R, and let f(π) denote the expected full-information payoff:
m(π) =
∫
µ dH(µ; π), f(π) =
∫




Asm(πt) and f(πt) are conditional expectations given all the information available at time
t, the Law of Iterated Expectations implies that Et[m(πT )] = m(πt) and Et[f(πT )] = f(πt)
for all T > t, i.e. both m(πt) and f(πt) are martingales with respect to the players’
information sets.
Players do not discount future payoffs, and are instead assumed to use the catching-up










Here, the integrand is the difference between what a player expects to receive and what
she would expect to receive were she to be fully informed. Note that a player’s payoff
depends on others’ actions only through their impact on the evolution of the sufficient
statistic.
1For a discussion of this objective and the role of the background signal, see Bolton and Harris (2000).
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The above objective highlights the potential for the sufficient statistic to serve as
a state variable; from now on, we shall restrict players to strategies that are Markovian
with respect to this variable. More precisely, the players’ common strategy space is a non-
empty set A of functions from the state space Π (consisting of all possible realizations of
the sufficient statistic) to [0, 1].
Assumption 4 (Strategies) The common strategy space A has the property that, start-
ing from any π ∈ Π, any strategy profile (k1, . . . , kN) ∈ AN induces a well-defined and
unique law of motion for πt.
This assumption implies that any strategy profile (k1, . . . , kN) ∈ AN gives rise to
well-defined payoff functions




(1− kn(πt)s+ kn(πt)m(πt)− f(πt)
}
dt
∣∣∣∣π0 = π] .
Strategy kn ∈ A is a best response against k¬n = (k1, . . . , kn−1, kn+1, . . . , kN) ∈ AN−1 if
un(π|kn, k¬n) ≥ un(π|k̃n, k¬n) for all π ∈ Π and all k̃n ∈ A. A Markov perfect equilibrium
(MPE) is a profile of strategies (k1, . . . , kN) ∈ AN that are mutually best responses. Such
an equilibrium is symmetric if k1 = k2 = . . . = kN .




when m(π) < s, and ∞ otherwise. Note that when the functions m and f are co-
monotonic, I inherits their monotonicity property.
Assumption 5 (Regularity) For any positive real numbers a < b, the function k : Π →
[0, 1] defined by
k(π) =

0 if I(π) ≤ a,
I(π)−a
b−a if a < I(π) < b,
1 if I(π) ≥ b
is an element of A.
The type of strategy considered in Assumption 5 arises in symmetric Markov perfect
equilibria of the experimentation game, to which we turn now.
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2 Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Suppose that all players except player n use the strategy k† ∈ A. By using the separability




s− f(π) + kn[m(π)− s] + [k0 + (N − 1)k†(π) + kn]Gun(π)
}
.
As the left-hand side is zero (a consequence of no discounting) and k0+(N −1)k†(π)+kn





s− f(π) + kn[m(π)− s]
k0 + (N − 1)k†(π) + kn
}
+ Gun(π),
which demonstrates that the optimal kn does not depend on continuation values. Straight-
forward algebra allows us to further simplify the problem by rewriting the Bellman equa-




[k0 + (N − 1)k†(π)][s−m(π)]− [f(π)− s]
k0 + (N − 1)k†(π) + kn
}
− [s−m(π)] + Gun(π).
When I(π) < k0 + (N − 1)k†(π), the numerator in the reworked Bellman equation
is positive and it is optimal to minimize the denominator by choosing kn = 0; when
I(π) > k0 + (N − 1)k†(π), the numerator is negative and it is optimal to maximize the
denominator by choosing kn = 1; when I(π) = k0 + (N − 1)k†(π), the numerator is zero
and all choices of kn are optimal.
There are three different ways, therefore, in which kn = k
†(π) can be an optimal choice
for player n: either k†(π) = 0 and I(π) ≤ k0, or k†(π) = 1 and I(π) ≥ k0 + N − 1, or
0 < k†(π) < 1 and I(π) = k0 + (N − 1)k†(π). This pins down k†(π) in terms of the
incentive to experiment, I(π), the strength of the background signal, k0, and the number
of players, N :
k†(π) =

0 if I(π) ≤ k0,
I(π)−k0
N−1 if k0 < I(π) < k0 +N − 1,
1 if I(π) ≥ k0 +N − 1.
Proposition. Under Assumptions 1–5, all players using the strategy k† constitutes the
unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of the experimentation game.
Proof: By Assumption 5, the strategy k† is an element of A; by Assumption 4, all
players using this strategy gives rise to a well-defined common payoff function u†. By
standard results, this function satisfies
0 = s− f(π) + k†(π)[m(π)− s] + [k0 +Nk†(π)]Gu†(π),
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and the above arguments imply that
0 ≥ s− f(π) + k(π)[m(π)− s] + [k0 + (N − 1)k†(π) + k(π)]Gu†(π)
for any strategy k ∈ A. The standard verification argument now shows that all players
using the strategy k† indeed constitutes an MPE. Uniqueness (as usual, up to changes
on a null set of states) follows from the fact that, in view of the above arguments, the
common strategy in any symmetric MPE must agree with k† almost everywhere.
Note that the set of beliefs for which k†(π) = 0 is independent of the number of
players and actually the same as for a single agent experimenting in isolation. This is a
stark manifestation of the incentive to free-ride on information generated by others. In the
terminology coined by Bolton and Harris (1999), it means that there is no “encouragement
effect”: the prospect of subsequent experimentation by other players provides a player
no incentive to increase the current intensity of experimentation and thereby shorten the
time at which the information generated by the other players arrives. Intuitively, this
simply reflects our assumption that players do not discount future payoffs and hence are
indifferent as to their timing. Formally, the absence of the encouragement effect is a direct
consequence of the separability condition: as the value of future experimentation by other
players is captured by a player’s equilibrium continuation values, yet best responses are
independent of those continuation values, there is no channel for future experimentation
by others to impact current actions.
Free-riding can also be seen in the fact that k† is non-increasing in N , and decreasing
where it assumes interior values. (See Figure 3 at the end of Section 3.1 for an illustration
of these two points.) The dependence of the overall intensity of experimentation on the
number of players is less clear cut: roughly speaking, Nk† increases in N at beliefs where
k† requires exclusive use of the risky arm, but decreases at beliefs where both arms are
used simultaneously. Further, any weak monotonicity of I in a component of π is inherited
by k†.
Finally, by the martingale convergence theorem, beliefs converge almost surely to the
degenerate distribution concentrated on the true value of µ; therefore f(π) converges to
either s or µ, and so k†(π) converges to either 0 or 1.
3 Examples
This section presents five specifications of priors, payoff-generating processes and strategy
spaces that satisfy Assumptions 1–5. For more details of Example 3.1, see Bolton and
Harris (1999, 2000), and for the discounted version of Example 3.2, see Keller, Rady
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and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010).2 A discounted single-agent version of
Example 3.3 with a two-point prior is solved in Cohen and Solan (2013). Models in which
agents observe stochastic processes and have beliefs like those in Examples 3.4 and 3.5
can be found in Jovanovic (1979) and Moscarini and Squintani (2010), respectively.
3.1 Brownian payoffs, discrete prior
We start with the case of a two-point prior. For n = 0, 1, . . . , N , we let Rn = µt + σZn
where (Z0, Z1, . . . , ZN) is an (N+1)-dimensional Wiener process, σ > 0 and µ ∈ {µ0, µ1}
with µ0 < s < µ1.
3
Let πt denote the probability that the players assign to the event µ = µ1 given their
observations up to time t. This is an obvious sufficient statistic for the problem at hand,
and we have
m(π) = (1− π)µ0 + πµ1, f(π) = (1− π)s+ πµ1.
Moreover, it follows from Liptser and Shiryayev (1977, Theorem 9.1) that for a single
player who allocates his entire resource to the risky arm, πt is a diffusion process with zero




(µ1 − µ0)2π2(1− π)2 u′′(π).
There is a straightforward generalization to the case where µ can take any one of L+1
possible values µ0 < µ1 < . . . < µL−1 < µL with µ0 < s < µL. Players’ beliefs now
become an L-vector π = (π1, . . . , πL) where πℓ is the probability assigned to µ = µℓ. The





ℓ=0 πℓ µℓ, f(π) =
∑L
ℓ=0 πℓ (s ∨ µℓ).
An extension of Liptser and Shiryayev (1977, Theorem 9.1) shows that for a single player
allocating his entire resource to the risky arm, πt is a driftless L-dimensional diffusion
2Keller and Rady (2015) consider a ‘bad news’ variant of this example in which the processes Sn and
Rn represent the cumulative cost of using an arm rather than the cumulative payoff.
3Note that the same parameter σ applies in both states of the world. If this were not the case, the
players could infer the true state in an instant from the quadratic variation of risky payoffs.
4More precisely, they show that the belief evolves according to dπt = σ
−1 πt[µ1 − m(πt)] dZ̄t where
the innovation process Z̄t, given by dZ̄t = σ
−1 ([µ−m(πt)] dt+ σ dZt), is a Wiener process relative to
the player’s information filtration.
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process with instantaneous variance-covariance matrix given by


















For L = 1, the case analyzed in Bolton and Harris (2000), the presence of background
information allows one to invoke a result of Engelbert and Schmidt (1984) whereby any
profile of Markov strategies in M([0, 1], [0, 1]), the set of Borel measurable functions from
the unit interval to itself, implies a unique solution for the belief dynamics.5 As this
result does not generalize to higher dimensions, the set of admissible strategies for L ≥ 2
will necessarily be a strict subset of M(∆L, [0, 1]). In view of standard existence and
uniqueness results for solutions of stochastic differential equations, a natural choice is
A = L(∆L, [0, 1]), the set of all Lipschitz continuous functions from the simplex to the
unit interval.
As the partial derivatives of the incentive to experiment I are clearly bounded on
the compact set Π(a, b) = {π ∈ Π : a ≤ I(π) ≤ b}, Assumption 5 holds trivially. Like the
functions m and f , moreover, I and the equilibrium strategy k† are non-decreasing in π.







































































































Figure 1: Equilibrium actions for L = 2






































































































Figure 2: Equilibrium actions for L = 2
and µ0 < s < µ1 < µ2
has a discrete distribution, we use parameter values µ0 = 2, µ1 = 5, µ2 = 8; in this pair of
figures, s = 6 on the left, s = 4 on the right, and in both cases N = 4.) The solid lines are
5See also Section 5.5 of Karatzas and Shreve (1988).
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the boundaries of the sets of beliefs at which the equilibrium requires full experimentation
(k† = 1) and no experimentation (k† = 0), respectively. The dotted lines are level curves
of k† for the experimentation intensities 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8. A comparison of the two
figures exhibits the familiar property that a decrease in the reward from the safe action
gives the players an increased incentive to experiment.
Figure 3 illustrates the effect that increasing the number of players has on the equi-
librium actions. On the horizontal axis we set π1 = π2 and let that common belief range
Belief
k†
Figure 3: Equilibrium actions for L = 2, π1 = π2 and N ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}
from 0 to 0.5: so it is a slice through the simplex from the µ0-vertex to the midpoint
of the opposite edge. (In this figure, s = 6, and N varies from 2 for the leftmost curve
to 10 for the rightmost curve; so the second curve from the left has the same parameter
values as in Figure 1.) As can clearly be seen, the set of beliefs where players use the
safe arm exclusively is independent of the number of players, reflecting the absence of the
encouragement effect. Free-riding is also evident: as the number of players, N , increases,
k† decreases at any belief where 0 < k† < 1. In this range of beliefs, the curves become
more convex as N increases – less steep for low beliefs, and much steeper for high beliefs.
3.2 Poisson payoffs, discrete prior
As in Example 3.1, we start with the case of a two-point prior and let R0, R1, . . . , RN
be independent Poisson processes with common intensity µ where µ ∈ {µ0, µ1} and µ0 <
s < µ1. We can again take πt, the posterior probability that µ = µ1, as the sufficient
statistic. In particular, m(π) = (1− π)µ0 + πµ1 and f(π) = (1− π)s+ πµ1 are the same
as in Example 3.1.
Now, consider a single player allocating his entire resource to the risky arm. With
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by Bayes’ rule. With probability 1−m(πt) dt, there is no such increment and Bayes’ rule
yields
dπt = −(µ1 − µ0) πt(1− πt) dt.
So, we have













Gu(π) = m(π) [u(j(π))− u(π)]− (µ1 − µ0)π(1− π)u′(π).
As in Example 3.1, there is a simple generalization to the case where µ can take any
one of L+1 possible values. Just as there, players’ beliefs become an L-vector, and m(π)





π1,t µ1, . . . , πℓ,t µℓ, . . . , πL,t µL
)
;
if no increment arrives, beliefs adjust infinitesimally by
dπℓ,t = −πℓ,t (µℓ −m(πt)) dt.
This leads to







For L = 1, the case analyzed in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady
(2010), one can take A to be the set of functions from the unit interval to itself which are
left-continuous and piecewise Lipschitz continuous; as beliefs drift down deterministically
in between Poisson events, these properties allow one to construct belief dynamics in a
pathwise fashion. When L ≥ 2, A = L(∆L, [0, 1]) is again a natural choice.
The functions I and k† are the same as in Example 3.1, and so Assumption 5 also
holds here.
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3.3 Lévy payoffs, discrete prior
Examples 3.1 and 3.2 are special cases of a specification where payoffs are generated
by a Lévy process, that is, a continuous-time process with independent and stationary
increments. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves in the following to Lévy processes with
a finite expected number of jumps per unit of time; the jump component of any such
process is a compound Poisson process.
Let Rn = ρ t + σ Zn + Y n, therefore, where (Z0, Z1, . . . , ZN) is again an (N + 1)-
dimensional Wiener process and Y 0, Y 1, . . . , Y N are independent compound Poisson pro-
cesses whose common Lévy measure ν has a finite second moment
∫
g2 ν(dg).6 While σ > 0
is the same in all states of the world, the drift rate ρ and the Lévy measure ν vary with the
state. We write (ρℓ, νℓ) for their realization in state ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , L, λℓ = νℓ(IR\{0}) for the
expected number of jumps per unit of time, and gℓ =
∫
IR\{0} g νℓ(dg) / λℓ for the expected
jump size.7 The expected risky payoff per unit of time in state ℓ is µℓ = ρℓ + λℓ gℓ. Once
more, the functions m and f are the same as in Example 3.1.
With these payoffs, the generator G is that of a jump-diffusion, given by a combination













[u(j(π, g))− u(π)] ν(π)(dg) −
L∑
ℓ=1







ℓ=0 πℓ ρℓ, ν(π) =
∑L
ℓ=0 πℓ νℓ, λ(π) =
∑L
ℓ=0 πℓ λℓ,
and jℓ(π, g) = πℓ νℓ(dg) / ν(π)(dg) is the revised probability after a jump of size g arrives.
Once more, we can take A = L(∆L, [0, 1]), and the functions I and k† are the same
as before. In the special case where ρ0 = . . . = ρL (so there is nothing to learn about the
drift rate) and λ0 = . . . = λL (so jumps occur at the same rate in all states of the world),
the process of posterior beliefs is piecewise constant, and we can take A = M(∆L, [0, 1]).
The framework with Lévy payoff processes and discrete priors permits the analysis of
experimentation games in which the size of a jump in cumulative payoffs is informative,
and – in the special case just described – even the only source of information. Moreover,
6Here, ν(B) < ∞ is the expected number of jumps per unit of time whose size is in the Borel set
B ⊆ IR\{0}. The finite second moment ensures that the processes Rn have finite mean and finite quadratic
variation.
7Our assumptions on the Lévy measures ensure that the players cannot infer the true state instanta-
neously from the jump part of risky payoffs.
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it is straightforward to model situations in which large payoff increments are bad news.8
For example, let L = 1 for simplicity, with ρ0 = ρ1 and λ0 = λ1. Assume that
the payoff increments are in the set {s − 10, s − 5, s + 5, s + 10}. For the ‘good’ arm,
the associated probabilities of a jump of that size are {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.1}, so the expected
increment is s+1; for the ‘bad’ arm, the associated probabilities of a jump of that size are
{0.5, 0.1, 0.1, 0.3}, and the expected increment is s− 2. When a payoff increment occurs,
the belief jumps – up if the increment is moderate (s − 5 and s + 5 are relatively more
likely if the arm is ‘good’), and down if the increment is extreme (s− 10 and s + 10 are
relatively more likely if the arm is ‘bad’). So, in this stripped-down illustration, an arrival
of the largest possible payoff increment is bad news, and may well cause the players to
stop experimenting.
3.4 Brownian payoffs, normal prior
In this specification, the risky arms and background signal are as in Example 3.1 except
for the assumption that µ can now take any real value. At time t, players believe that
µ is distributed according to a normal distribution with mean mt and precision τt > 0.





, where ϕ denotes the standard normal density.
Again, consider a single player allocating his entire resource to the risky arm. Following
Chernoff (1968, Lemma 4.1), or Liptser and Shiryayev (1977, Theorem 10.1), τt increases
deterministically at the rate σ−2 and mt is a driftless diffusion process with diffusion
coefficient σ−1 τ−1t relative to the player’s information filtration.
9 Applying Itô’s lemma
and taking expectations, we see that

























Since the precision τt increases over time, the relevant state space is the half-plane
Π = IR × [τ0,∞[ . As to admissible strategies, we take A to be the set of all functions
k : Π → [0, 1] such that kτ−1 is Lipschitz continuous on Π. We show that this is sufficient
for Assumption 4 to be satisfied, i.e. there is a well-defined and unique law of motion for
8In Keller et al. (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010, 2015) jump sizes are completely uninformative,
while in Cohen and Solan (2013) jumps are informative, but always good news.
9More precisely, it can be shown that dmt = σ
−1 τ−1t dZ̄t and dτt = σ
−2 dt where, now, the innovation
process is dZ̄t = σ
−1 ([µ−mt] dt+ σ dZt). Note that the expression equivalent to that for dmt to be
found in equation (9) of Jovanovic (1979) omits the term [µ−mt] dt.
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the state.
Given a strategy profile (k1, . . . , kN) ∈ AN , the corresponding intensity of experi-
mentation K =
∑N
n=1 kn also lies in A, and the system we need to solve is
dm = K(m, τ) τ−1σ−1dZ̄, dτ = K(m, τ) σ−2dt.
The change of variable η = ln τ transforms this into dm = K(m, eη) e−ησ−1dZ̄ and dη =
K(m, eη) e−ησ−2dt; as K(m, eη) e−η is Lipschitz continuous in (m, η) on IR × [ln τ0,∞[ ,
this system has a unique solution, verifying Assumption 4.
In preparation for showing that Assumption 5 is satisfied by this example, we derive
m(π), f(π), and I(π). The expected current payoff m(π) is simply the projection of π on
its first component. For the expected full-information payoff, we have
f(π) = sΦ(z) +m [1− Φ(z)] + τ−1/2ϕ(z),
where z = (s − m)τ 1/2 and Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution
function. To see this, note first that we trivially obtain H(s;π) =
∫ s
−∞ h(µ;π) dµ =∫ z






, moreover, we have dh(µ;π) =












= m [1−H(s; π)] + τ−1 h(s; π) = m [1− Φ(z)] + τ−1/2 ϕ(z).
The above representation makes it straightforward to verify that f is strictly increasing
in m and strictly decreasing in τ .10 By what was said above, I and k† are non-decreasing
in m and non-increasing in τ .
When m < s we have
I(π) =
sΦ(z) +m [1− Φ(z)] + τ−1/2ϕ(z)− s
s−m
= Φ(z)− 1 + z−1ϕ(z).
In the appendix we verify Assumption 5 for this example by showing that Iτ−1 is Lip-
schitz continuous on Π(a, b) = {π ∈ Π : a ≤ I(π) ≤ b}. This is more involved than in the
examples with a discrete prior because the set Π(a, b) is unbounded.
Figure 4 illustrates equilibrium actions as a function of the posterior mean m and
variance τ−1. (In this figure, s = 6 and N = 4.) As in Figures 1–2, the solid curves are
the boundaries of the sets of beliefs at which the equilibrium requires full experimentation
10Alternatively, since s∨ µ is increasing in µ, a first-order stochastic dominance argument can be used
to establish that ∂f(π)/∂m > 0, and since s ∨ µ is convex in µ, a second-order stochastic dominance






Figure 4: Equilibrium actions for Brownian payoffs and normal prior
or no experimentation, and the dashed lines are level curves for k† equal to 0.2, 0.4,
0.6 and 0.8. All these curves are downward sloping; as one would expect, there is a
trade-off between mean and variance with the latter capturing the “option value” of
experimentation. In particular, a very high variance is needed to induce a high intensity
of experimentation at low means. As the mean approaches the safe flow payoff, the level
curves become steeper and steeper so that the posterior variance has a diminishing impact
on the intensity with which the players explore the risky arm.
3.5 Poisson payoffs, gamma prior
The risky arms and background signal are specified as in Example 3.2 except for the
assumption that µ can now take any non-negative value. Let s > 0 for the safe arm.
At time t, players believe that µ is distributed according to the gamma distribution
Ga(αt, βt) with parameters αt > 0 and βt > 0. Given π = (α, β) ∈ ]0,∞[2, the probability
density function for µ is h(µ;π) = [βα/Γ(α)]µα−1e−βµ, and we have m(π) = α/β. (The
corresponding variance of µ is α/β2.)
Once more, consider a single player allocating his entire resource to the risky arm.
With probability m(πt) dt, he obtains a positive increment between t and t+ dt, in which
case Bayes’ rule implies that πt jumps to (αt +1, βt); with probability 1−m(πt) dt, there
is no such increment and dπt = (dαt, dβt) = (0, dt). Thus, α counts arrivals of increments
and β measures the time that has elapsed – see, for example, DeGroot (1970, Chapter 9).
We obtain


















Gu(π) = m(π) [u(α + 1, β)− u(π)] + ∂u(π)
∂β
.
Given that αt and βt increase over time, and αt can only do so in unit increments,
the relevant state space is Π = {α0 + ℓ : ℓ = 0, 1, 2, . . .} × [β0,∞[ . For A, we choose the
set of all functions k : Π → [0, 1] such that k(α0 + ℓ, ·) is right-continuous and piecewise
Lipschitz continuous for all ℓ, so Assumption 4 is satisfied.
Again, in preparation for showing that Assumption 5 is also satisfied, we restate m(π),
then derive f(π) and I(π).
m(π) = α
β
, f(π) = sH(s;α, β) + α
β
[1−H(s;α + 1, β)].
The second term in the expression for f is obtained as follows:∫ ∞
s
µ dH(µ; π) =
∫ ∞
s













h(µ;α + 1, β) dµ
= α
β
[1−H(s;α + 1, β)].
The formula for f makes it straightforward to verify that, exactly like m, this function
is strictly increasing in α and strictly decreasing in β.11 Consequently, I and k† are
non-decreasing in α and non-increasing in β.
For m(π) = α/β < s, we have
I(π) =
sH(s;α, β) + α
β










In the appendix we show that I(α, ·) has a bounded first derivative when m(π) < s for




,∞[ : a ≤ I(π) ≤ b
}
, thus verifying Assumption 5
for this example.
Figure 5 illustrates the mean-variance trade-off in equilibrium actions for Poisson
payoffs and gamma prior. (Here, as in the example with Brownian payoffs and normal
prior, s = 6 and N = 4; the curves shown are thus the exact counterparts of those in
Figure 4.) To compute the level curves, one uses the fact that the shape parameter α
11Alternatively, for α′ > α′′ the likelihood ratio h(µ;α′, β)/h(µ;α′′, β) is increasing, and for β′ > β′′ the
likelihood ratio h(µ;α, β′)/h(µ;α, β′′) is decreasing. Since the likelihood ratio ordering implies first-order






Figure 5: Equilibrium actions for Poisson payoffs and gamma prior
equals the squared mean of the gamma distribution divided by its variance, and β is α
divided by the mean. The similarity to Figure 4 is striking; a closer comparison reveals
that the level curves in the Brownian-normal case are somewhat steeper than those in the
Poisson-gamma case. This is because in the former, an increase in the variance induces
a mean-preserving spread for the random variable µ on the whole real axis, whereas in
the latter, the mean-preserving spread is concentrated on the positive half-axis and thus
raises the option value of experimentation by more.
4 An Example Where Separability Fails
The aim of this section is to present a specification of beliefs and payoffs that violates
separability. To this end, we modify Example 3.1 by introducing state-switching: the
unknown drift of the Brownian motion switches between levels µ0 and µ1 according to a
continuous-time Markov process with transition probabilities
Pr(µt+dt = µ1 | µt = µ0) = p0 dt, Pr(µt+dt = µ0 | µt = µ1) = p1 dt,
where pℓ > 0 (ℓ = 0, 1).
Given the belief πt that µt = µ1, the players assign probability (1 − πt)p0 dt to a
transition from µt = µ0 to µt+dt = µ1; similarly, they assign probability πtp1 dt to a
transition from µt = µ1 to µt+dt = µ0. The former induces a positive drift for πt, the
latter a negative drift, and the combined effect leads to
E [dπt | πt, Kt ] = [(1− πt)p0 − πtp1] dt,
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adding a term to the infinitesimal generator of π that is not linear in k0 +Kt. In fact, we
have
E [u(πt+dt) | πt, k1,t, . . . , kN,t ]
= u(πt) +
{







so condition (1) does not hold for this specification. Separability fails because the speed
of mean reversion introduced by state switching is completely unaffected by the intensity
with which the players sample their payoff generating processes.





s− θ∗n + kn[m(π)− s] + [(1− π)p0 − πp1]u′n(π)
+ 1
2







with θ∗n denoting the highest achievable long-run average payoff. It is clearly impossible
to rewrite this equation so as to separate all terms involving u′n or u
′′
n from the choice
variable kn. In other words, Markovian best responses can no longer be computed without
knowledge of the value function un.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have seen that under the separability condition, the players’ strategies in a symmetric
MPE of the undiscounted experimentation game depend only on the expected current
payoff from the risky arm and the expected full-information payoff. Under a discrete
prior distribution for the unknown average payoff per unit of time, these two expected
payoffs are fully determined – the equilibrium strategy is then invariant to the specification
of the payoff-generating process.
As to the examples with a continuous prior distribution, recall that in Example 3.4
(Brownian noise, normal prior) the precision of the posterior distribution increases un-
boundedly with time, as does the inverse of the variance in Example 3.5 (Poisson noise,
gamma prior) – consequently the posterior probability density function becomes concen-
trated on a narrow domain of the support. If we approximate the normal or gamma
distribution with a discrete distribution (Example 3.1 or 3.2) then, over time, the beliefs
become more and more concentrated on the discrete values closest to the true parameter
µ – this suggests that we could take the ‘engineering’ approach and focus on discrete
18
distributions, with the specification of the payoff-generating processes being irrelevant.12
Of course, the evolution of the agents’ posterior belief does depend on how the payoffs
are generated, as do the players’ equilibrium payoffs; and to calculate the latter, one has
to solve a functional equation that involves the operator G, which encodes the evolution
of beliefs.
12But note that if for T very large the two closest neighbours of µ in the support of H(·;πT ) are µi
and µℓ with µi < µ < µℓ, then, although m(πT ) ≃ µ, we would have Var[µ | πT ] ≃ (µℓ − µ)(µ− µi) ≫ 0.
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Appendix
Verification of Assumption 5 in Example 3.4
From the main body of the text, for m < s we have
I(π) = Φ(z)− 1 + z−1ϕ(z)
where z = (s−m)τ1/2.
The function F (z) = Φ(z) − 1 + z−1ϕ(z) is a strictly decreasing bijection from ]0,∞[ to
itself with first derivative F ′(z) = −z−2ϕ(z). For any positive real number c, therefore, we
have I(π) = c if and only if (s − m)τ1/2 = F−1(c). At any such (m, τ) in the half-plane
Π = IR × [τ0,∞[ , we have ∂I/∂m = −F ′(F−1(c)) τ1/2 and ∂I/∂τ = 12F
′(F−1(c))F−1(c) τ−1.
To verify Assumption 5, it suffices to show that Iτ−1 is Lipschitz continuous on Π(a, b) =
{π ∈ Π : a ≤ I(π) ≤ b} for any positive real numbers a < b. For I(π) = c, we have ∂(Iτ−1)/∂m =






τ−2. This establishes that both
partial derivatives of Iτ−1 are bounded along any level curve I(π) = c in Π. Letting c range
from a to b shows that they are bounded on the whole of Π(a, b), so Iτ−1 is indeed Lipschitz
continuous there.
Verification of Assumption 5 in Example 3.5
Again from the main body of the text, for m(π) = α/β < s we have
I(π) =
sH(s;α, β)− αβ H(s;α+ 1, β)
s− αβ
− 1.
We fix α as well as positive real numbers a < b. To verify Assumption 5, it suffices to show that
I(α, ·) is Lipschitz continuous on the set B(a, b) =
{
β ∈ ]αs ,∞[ : a ≤ I(π) ≤ b
}
. To this end, we
note first that











For β = α/s and µ < s, the term in square brackets under the integral is positive, so we have
H(s;α, αs )−H(s;α+1,
α
s ) > 0. For β ↘
α
s , therefore, the numerator sH(s;α, β)−
α
β H(s;α+1, β)
in the above expression for I(π) tends to a positive limit. Given that I(π) is finite for β ∈ B(a, b),
this implies that the denominator in the above expression must be bounded away from 0, i.e. β
must be bounded away from α/s on B(a, b). Using the fact that
∂H(s;α, β)
∂β
= αβ [H(s;α, β)−H(s;α+ 1, β)] ,
it is now straightforward to verify that that I(α, ·) has a bounded first derivative on B(a, b).
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